Arms Control Law Chosen as one of the ABA Journal’s 2013 Blawg 100!!!!!!!

Remember back in July when I posted that the American Bar Association Journal was seeking nominations for its annual list of the 100 best legal blogs? Yeah, me neither. I had basically forgotten about it, thinking that there was pretty much no chance ACL would make the list.  But I just got the official word today that Arms Control Law has been chosen for the ABA Journal’s 2013 Blawg 100 list, as one of the top 100 best blogs for a legal audience!!! 

See the official announcement here.

Here’s what they say about ACL:

We are highly impressed by this freshman blog—even if its matter-of-fact posts on bioterrorism and nuclear proliferation keep us up at night. The bloggers have their fingers on the pulse of the sometimes-clandestine international arms race and the treaties that aim to stop it. Columns have examined fallout from the NSA surveillance scandal and legal implications for chemical weapon attacks in Syria. It’s a must-read for foreign policymakers, but also easily accessible to the layperson.

I’m really thrilled about this. Its extremely gratifying. I don’t want to turn this into an academy award speech, but I do want to thank our readers who took the time to nominate ACL for this distinction.

Blogging is something that I only started doing a little over a year ago, and I do sometimes question whether the benefits outweigh the costs of time and effort, and the fights that I seem to get pulled into.  But I have found blogging to be overall a valuable complement to my normal academic work, and this new recognition helps to convince me that our efforts here are seen to be valuable by others.  This will help to keep me going.

So congratulations to all of my fellow bloggers, and thanks to our readers!!!!

The New Deal Between the P5+1 and Iran

Like many, I stayed up late Saturday night following the Twitter updates of what was developing in the Geneva negotiations between Iran and the P5+1.  And like most, I was thrilled to hear that an initial accord had been reached. A historic agreement that potentially signals a thawing in relations between Iran and the West – the best such indication since 1979. It was a night of high drama.

I’ve now had a chance to read over the product of this agreement – a four page document entitled Simply “Joint Plan of Action.”

I would observe first of all that I agree with Duncan Hollis in his assessment over at Opinio Juris that this agreement is intended by the parties to be non-legally-binding. Duncan provides a review of the reasons for this conclusion. As I noted in a comment to his post, I think the diplomats in Geneva had enough trouble reaching agreement on a text in this politically binding form, and would have shuddered at the thought of having to get it approved by their respective legislatures.

However, legally non-binding international agreements can still have significant legal, as well as political, implications.

The document lays out in detail Iran’s commitments under the accord. They comprise a very significant list of concessions, cumulatively limiting Iran’s nuclear program and preventing any further development of the program for the six month duration of the agreement. I think it is worth noting that all of these steps together comprise a more significant list of concessions than was expected by most observers. Nevertheless, it is also important to note that none of them, and not even their sum, is beyond what Iran had already offered in past negotiations, going back at least to 2005. See this summary of official negotiation proposals going back to 2003.  This observation provides support for Hossein Mousavian’s observation in his recent FT piece that:

[T]he idea that it is sanctions that have brought Tehran to the table is wrong. The real cause is the desire of new President Hassan Rouhani to reach a rapprochement with the US, the EU, its neighbours and other world powers, alongside the fact that the US red line has changed from “no enrichment of uranium” to “no nuclear bomb”.

With all of these concessions, one might wonder what’s in this new deal for Iran? Roughly $7 billion in sanctions relief? Yes. That’s certainly useful, particularly for newly elected Iranian President Rouhani’s domestic audience, which is looking to hold him to his campaign promises of sanctions relief.

But much more important than the immediate sanctions relief for Iran, is the fact that this agreement not only sets forth commitments undertaken by both sides during the agreed six month term, but it also sets forth a common vision of an end state, pursuant to a future comprehensive agreement, towards which this initial agreement is just the first step.  This has long been what Iranian nuclear negotiators have wanted – a negotiating framework with the West that includes an agreed understanding that once the negotiated commitments have all been satisfactorily fulfilled, all sanctions on Iran (both multilateral and unilateral) will be lifted; Iran’s noncompliance case with the IAEA will be closed; and Iran will be able to retain its indigenous full front-end nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment. This agreement provides for exactly such a commonly agreed vision of an end state.  Because of this, Iran was willing to make the significant concessions that it did.  Note these provisions from the agreement:

This comprehensive solution would involve a reciprocal, step-by-step process, and would produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions, as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme.

and

Following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its full duration, the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any non–nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.

Treating Iran’s nuclear program “in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT” means at least implicitly recognizing that, like many other NPT NNWS, Iran will have enduring full front end nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, including uranium enrichment.

Also when considering what Iran gets out of this agreement, it’s important to note what is not mentioned in the new agreement. There is no mention in the agreement whatsoever of the IAEA’s allegations of possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program. There was similarly no mention of this issue in Iran’s most recent agreement with the IAEA a couple of weeks ago. This is very significant, as it leaves out of the initial agreement any requirement for Iran to acknowledge these allegations, or to do any more to address them than it already has done. I have argued before on a number of occasions that the PMD allegations against Iran by the IAEA are both insubstantial, and irrelevant to Iran’s international legal obligations.

Iran also in this agreement undertakes no commitment either to suspend its uranium enrichment program, even temporarily, or to dismantle it. All serious observers agree at this point that Iran will have a uranium enrichment program on the other side of any comprehensive solution worked out with the West. This longstanding demand of the West and of Israel – that Iran give up its uranium enrichment capacity entirely – is not included in this agreement or in the negotiating framework it envisions.

What about all the fuss regarding Iran’s right to enrichment under NPT Article IV? As many will know, the inclusion in the new agreement of an explicit recognition of Iran’s right to enrich uranium was one of Iran’s key demands leading up to the Geneva negotiations. The week before the negotiations, however, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif seemed to back away from this demand, focusing on the independent existence of the right to peaceful nuclear energy, including enrichment, in international law. As he stated in a November 20 video posted on Youtube : 

Rights are not granted, and since they are not granted, they cannot be ceased.

During the Geneva negotiations, Iran was apparently unable to get into the agreed text the explicit recognition of its right that it long sought. However, after the agreement was signed, Zarif has maintained the position that such recognition was not necessary, because the right to peaceful use and enrichment is independently established in international law. As he stated in a Tweet on November 24:

The right to enrichment emanates from the inalienable right in NPT, defined by 2010 NPT Review Conference to include fuel cycle activities.

I have written about the right to peaceful nuclear energy recognized in Article IV(1) of the NPT quite extensively, including in a few online pieces over the past couple of weeks – see here and here. In these pieces, I’ve argued that Zarif is essentially correct that the NPT does provide for a right of peaceful nuclear energy research, production and use, that includes the right to enrich uranium.  I’ve further argued that this right has juridical implications for other states and international organizations, including the UN Security Council.

As I wrote a couple of weeks ago:

In my view, the recognition by over 190 states parties to the NPT that all states have such an inalienable right, which I interpret to include all elements of the full nuclear fuel cycle including uranium enrichment, strongly suggests that the right to peaceful nuclear energy research, production and use is one of the fundamental rights of states in international law. In my view, both fundamental and acquired rights of states should be understood to create in third parties, both states and international organizations, a legal obligation to respect those rights. This means that other states and international organizations are under an international legal obligation not to act in serious prejudice of states’ rights. In the case of fundamental rights, this reciprocal obligation is of a jus cogens order, meaning that all states and international organizations are under a jus cogens order legal obligation not to act to seriously prejudice the fundamental rights of other states. When states or international organization do act in serious prejudice of a state’s fundamental rights, that action is an internationally wrongful act, and implicates the international responsibility of the acting state or international organization.

According to this analysis, UN Security Council Resolution 1696, which commands Iran to cease uranium enrichment, constitutes a violation of international law, at least as to this particular command, and is void of legal effect (See Article 25 of the UN Charter).

Note that the often heard rebuttal to this argument, which references Article 103 of the UN Charter, is in fact erroneous and inapplicable. Article 103 of the UN Charter provides that “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”  My analysis, which is based on the recognition of a fundamental right of states in international law, and the juridical implication of an obligation in other states and international organizations to respect that right, is unaffected and unanswered by this provision, which merely recognizes that in the case of a conflict between UN member states’ international legal obligations under the Charter, and their obligations deriving from other sources, the Charter obligations trump.  It does not speak to the legal obligations of the Security Council as an organ of an international organization. Nor does it speak at all to conflicts between the obligations of the UN Charter, and the rights of states in international law. So again, Article 103 of the UN Charter is inapposite and inapplicable to this question.

I would recommend this analysis particularly to Kevin Jon Heller over at Opinio Juris, and to Ryan Goodman over at Just Security.  In my opinion, both are incorrect in their analysis of the juridical dynamic between the NPT Article IV(1) right on the one hand, and the decisions of the Security Council on the other.  Both give insufficient consideration to the juridical meaning of a right in international law, and rely on erroneous readings of Article 103 of the UN Charter, in drawing their conclusions.

I do think that, in light of the new agreement between Iran and the P5+1, there is now dissonance of an exponentially higher degree than before between what the P5 in particular have now agreed to with Iran directly (which implicitly recognizes that Iran will continue to enrich uranium), and the commands of the P5 in Security Council resolutions including 1696 and 1737 (which inter alia require Iran to cease uranium enrichment).  The fairly obvious implication of this dissonance is that, in order for the agreed framework of negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran to proceed, the Security Council will need to withdraw these commands and, as Marko Milanovic wrote in a comment to Heller’s post, “bless” the new agreement.

In closing, after reading the text of the new agreement, I am still thrilled that it has been accomplished. This is a mutually beneficial deal for all parties, and an important step in securing international peace and security. It sets forth an agreed vision of an enduring peace between Iran and world powers regarding Iran’s nuclear program. This first diplomatic step raises hopes of a broader normalization of relations between Iran and the West, higher than at any time in the past thirty-four years.

New FT Piece by Hossein Mousavian on Iran Sanctions Effectiveness

See the article here.

In this piece, friend of ACL Hossein Mousavian persuasively demonstrates the fallacy of arguments claiming that Western sanctions have been a success because they forced Iran to the negotiating table. As Mousavian, who was intimately involved in Iran’s earlier nuclear negotiations with the West, correctly points out, the negotiating history between Iran and the West includes a number of occasions stretching back a decade, during which Iran was willing to offer significant concessions in order to conclude an agreement. These serious attempts at negotiation by Iran occurred long before Western sanctions reached their recent abusive levels, and were in several cases only unsuccessful because of a failure on the part of Western negotiators to present a unified front and negotiate seriously and reasonably. As Mousavian summarizes:

[T]he idea that it is sanctions that have brought Tehran to the table is wrong. The real cause is the desire of new President Hassan Rouhani to reach a rapprochement with the US, the EU, its neighbours and other world powers, alongside the fact that the US red line has changed from “no enrichment of uranium” to “no nuclear bomb”.

My New IRD Piece on Iran’s Legal Right to Enrichment

Just today Iranian Diplomacy published a new piece from me on Iran’s legal right to enrichment:

http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/en/page/1924877/Does+Iran+Have+a+Legal+Right+to+Enrich+Uranium+Yes..html

If you’re following the current of Geneva negotiations on Twitter (follow Laura Rozen and Julian Borger) you’ll know that this issue is front and center today:

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/21/iran-geneva-nuclear-talks-enrich-uranium-guarantee

Is the IAEA Actually Starting to Listen and Apply Legal Standards More Correctly?!?

I was just reading over the new IAEA DG report on Iran, released today. It struck me that the first paragraph of the summary section, which has remained pretty much unchanged for a long time now, suddenly has been changed – only slightly but I think significantly.

First, here is the language of that paragraph from the past two DG reports, in May and August:

May 22, 2013

67. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.

August 28, 2013

67. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.

Now look at the report released today:

November 14, 2013

65. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.

See the difference? The new DG report dropped the phrase “as Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol”.  I’m really not sure how to account for this difference.

As readers will know, I’ve written at length about the IAEA DG reports on Iran, and specifically how, in this first summary paragraph of those reports, the IAEA has utilized incorrect legal standards in making an assessment of Iran’s compliance with its safeguards obligations.  While this new formulation of the DG’s finding still refers to the agency’s inability to assess the absence of undeclared nuclear material (which it really shouldn’t, because according to Iran’s current safeguards obligations it’s not the IAEA’s job to assess this fact), nevertheless the removal of the indicated phrase does significantly change the tone of the sentence, from one which places the fault for this inability of the agency on Iran, to instead stating as a more neutral fact that the agency simply “is not in a position” to make this assessment.

Honestly, I think this is a big improvement, and I think it goes a long way towards rectifying the erroneous expression of legal standards that has been present in IAEA DG reports on Iran for some time now.  Because honestly, the DG report on MOST NNWS could say the exact same thing – even if they have both a CSA and an AP in place. Now, I know that the IAEA has in the case of some states reached a point of confidence about the absence of undeclared material, at which they are willing to reach a “broader conclusion” that all nuclear materials within the state are in peaceful use. However, according to the 2012 safeguards statement published by the IAEA, out of the 179 states that have safeguards agreements with the IAEA, the IAEA could only make this broader conclusion, including undeclared nuclear material, for 60 of those states. Meaning that there are currently 119 states, including Iran, about which the IAEA could make the exact same statement, verbatim, that it has made in this first summary paragraph of the November 14 safeguards report on Iran.  

I think this really helps to put Iran’s safeguards obligation compliance into its proper context. Iran is currently in compliance with its safeguards obligations with the IAEA. As with 118 other safeguarded states, the IAEA is simply not in a position to determine that there are unsafeguarded nuclear materials in Iran.

I think that this finding, when properly understood and contextualized, helps significantly to bring perspective to Iran’s standing with the IAEA, and with its international nuclear obligations.  

Robert Kelley Pretty Much Explains it All

Friend of ACL Bob Kelley, who is one of the most qualified people on the planet to discuss the technical aspects of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons programs, has given a couple of interviews to The Real News about the recent joint statement between Iran and the IAEA, the P5+1 talks, and a number of the most important issues and questions surrounding Iran’s nuclear program. The result is just a tremendous amount of clarity and information on these questions. I profited immensely from listening to him explain things. I HIGHLY encourage all readers to view these short but insightful interviews, which are accompanied by written transcripts, and to forward them on to a wider audience, because Bob really does address important current questions here and provides a lot of clarity. I also think Bob’s recommendation to Iran to voluntarily produce a full report on any past research on nuclear weapons makes a lot of sense, and would help take any remaining wind out of the sails of Iran’s detractors in the West and at the IAEA.

Here are the links to the two parts of the same interview:

http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=10995

http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=11000

Some Additional Observations on the IAEA/Iran Joint Statement

I was so glad to see that Pierre had posted some observations about the newly issued joint statement from Iran and the IAEA. I had been meaning to write something about this significant event, but hadn’t yet found time. Now I can just piggyback on Pierre’s piece and add a few of my own observations.

First, I think that this statement was clearly meant to be non-legally-binding, and is most correctly categorized as a memorandum of understanding between the parties, precisely as Pierre mentioned.  I actually see it as supplementary to the subsidiary arrangement agreement which Iran already has in place with the IAEA, and which covers precisely these sorts of details regarding access to sites inside Iran, in implementation of Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA.  I have argued elsewhere, and still maintain, that subsidiary arrangement agreements between the IAEA and NNWS are best understood as non-legally-binding agreements between the parties, stipulating agreed procedures for joint implementation of the rules and procedures contained in the CSA.

The only things in the new joint statement that I see as adding to what has already been agreed between Iran and the IAEA in their subsidiary arrangements agreement, are the specific points in the Annex about access to the Gchine mine and the Arak Heavy Water Production Plant (which I think is a separate facility from the Arak Heavy Water Reactor, still under construction). So these would appear to be steps forward.

I was pleased to see that nowhere in the joint statement was mentioned PMD-related issues generally, or the Parchin facility specifically. It would appear that both in these talks in Tehran, and also in the Geneva talks between Iran and the P5+1, Western powers and the IAEA made the prudent decision not to focus on these issues during negotiations, thereby avoiding the dynamic which seems to have been present so much in recent years of the tail of PMD issues, wagging the dog of a broader agreement on Iran’s nuclear program going forward.  I’ve written about the PMD issues and Parchin previously including here.  I sincerely hope that further negotiations similarly marginalize these red herring issues.

The Iran-IAEA Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation: A Way Out of the Impasse?

On 11 November 2013, while the (overall successful) negotiations in Geneva between the P-5+1 and Iran had been postponed for a few days, direct talks in Tehran between the International Atomic Energy Agency and Iran proved fruitful. In Geneva, according to open source information, many differences have been solved and only minor gaps remain, and it appears that the main reason why an agreement has not been finalized during this round of negotiation lies in the fact that the position of the P-5+1 was not united, since the French delegation has adopted a ‘hard’ stance. At the same time, in Tehran IAEA DG Yukiya Amano and Mr. Ali Akbar Salehi, Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, signed a ‘Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation’. The document states that both parties have agreed ‘to strengthen their cooperation and dialogue aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme through the resolution of all outstanding issues that have not already been resolved by the IAEA’.

At first reading, the following observations may be made regarding this Joint Statement:

1. The ‘Framework for Cooperation’ reminds to some extent the ‘Work Plan’ that was agreed between the IAEA and Iran in August 2007, under which Iran pledged to provide over the course of the next few months, answers to questions from the Agency, as well as clarifications and access to information, regarding remaining ‘outstanding issues’ on its nuclear programme. The Framework appears less detailed at this stage than the Work Plan, but this may be explained by the fact that it is understood as a ‘first step’, during which Iran and the IAEA agree to implement a handful of ‘practical measures’ listed in an Annex (entitled ‘Initial Practical Measures to be Taken by Iran Within Three Months’) to the Joint Statement.

2. What is the legal nature of the Joint Statement and of the Framework it embodies? It may be observed at first sight that the Joint Statement matches prima facie the definition of a treaty contained in the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations. Article 2(1)(a) of  the 1986 Vienna Convention defines a treaty as ‘an international agreement governed by international law and concluded in written form […] between one or more States and one or more international organizations. The Joint Statement is indeed an international agreement, and it has been concluded in ‘written form’. It is less certain that the Joint Statement be ‘governed by international law’, since this criterion refers to the presence of an intention of the parties to create obligations under international law (as opposed to mere mutual understandings regarding their behaviour). Indeed, it may be reasonably argued that given the terms chosen by the negotiating parties (‘[…] Iran and the IAEA will cooperate further with respect to verification activities to be undertaken by the IAEA to resolve all present and past issues. It is foreseen that Iran’s cooperation will include providing the IAEA with timely information about its nuclear facilities and in regard to the implementation of transparency measures […] – emphasis added), the Joint Statement is more of a nature of a preliminary agreement, a kind of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), and as such that its binding force is debatable. It may also be viewed as a mere Confidence-Building Measure (CBM), and as such voluntary and non-binding in nature. Given the unclear legal nature of the Joint Statement, it is unclear what would be the legal consequences of the non-fulfillment of an undertaking assumed under the Joint Statement. It is significant that in terms of implementation and ‘compliance’, the document merely provides that the IAEA ‘will report to the Board of Governors on progress in the implementation of these measures’, without further elaborating on the follow-up process.

3. Be it as it may, it appears that the Joint Statement is an important step forward, as well as a significant sign of goodwill by Iran, since the undertakings by Iran under the Joint Statement and its Annex go well beyond the obligations of Iran under its 1974 Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, and that in some respects (i.e. in terms of the provision of ‘advance’ information on contemplated new nuclear installations) they are (as far as it appears from the wording of the Annex) even broader in scope than those that a country is supposed to assume under an Additional Protocol (AP). However, Iran’s Safeguards Agreement cannot be deemed per se superseded by the Joint Statement. On the contrary, it is to be assumed that the Safeguards Agreement is applicable to the Joint Statement mutatis mutandis, or in other words that the Joint Statement is to be read in conjunction with the Safeguards Agreement, in particular as regards procedures and conditions of cooperation.

4. It may be reminded that the 2007 Work Plan had been satisfactorily implemented by Iran, which led the IAEA to issue a report in February 2008 stating it had been able to conclude that answers provided by Iran, in accordance with the work plan, were either ‘consistent with its findings’ or ‘not inconsistent’ with its own findings. As a consequence, the only remaining issue, according to the 2008 report, was ‘the alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle’. This latter issue had not been considered as one of the ‘outstanding issues’ that the Work Plan was supposed to clarify, but it subsequently unfolded in such a way as to become the focus of the IAEA’s ‘concerns’, with important negative consequences such as the imposition of additional unilateral economic measures against Iran by some countries (whose doubtful legality I examined here, here and here). By the way it shall be reminded that one reason (maybe the main reason) why the issue of ‘alleged studies’ (now termed ‘Possible Military Dimension’) was not resolved since 2008 lies in the fact that the countries which provided the information to the IAEA did not accept that it be transferred to Iran, contrary to the relevant provision of the Work Plan (see para. III).

It is now to be hoped that, if supplemented in due course by technical and administrative understandings satisfactory to both parties and correctly applied, the Framework for Cooperation that the Joint Statement contemplates shall in turn address substantively all remaining ‘concerns’ expressed by the IAEA in its latest reports, and pave the way for the Iranian nuclear file to come back from the Security Council to a ‘routine’ IAEA scrutiny.

Scope, Meaning and Juridical Implication of the NPT Article IV(1) Inalienable Right

Interpreting the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Pages 79-84

Friends of ACL Flynt and Hillary Leverett Recently posted a piece on their excellent blog entitled “America’s Lead Iran Negotiator Misrepresents U.S. Policy (and International Law) to Congress.”  Their post is both troubling in its observation of official statements by US officials, and insightful regarding international law. The piece is here, and I recommend it highly.

Flynt and Hillary were kind enough to mention my work approvingly in this post, for which I’m grateful. They mention it particularly in the context of the interpretation of the NPT Article IV(1) right to peaceful nuclear energy. This is indeed something I’ve written about at length already. I’ll insert into this post the text from pages 79-84 of my 2011 book Interpreting the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on this subject. As you’ll see, when I’ve written about this topic, I’ve interpreted it as a full, free-standing right of all NNWS party to the treaty, and not as a contingent right, contrary to the interpretation of some NWS states.

The question of the scope of this right is one that continues to be debated. I have looked to the Lotus principle in international law (see the excerpt from my book) to show that the lawfulness of NNWS’, and in fact all states’, indigenous nuclear fuel cycle activities can be shown to derive from the absence of any prohibition of these activities in international law. This observation will, I have argued, serve to legally justify the full nuclear fuel cycle of activities within a NNWS, subject only to the positive requirements of Articles II and III of the NPT – i.e. no manufacture of nuclear explosive devices, and the conclusion of a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

The question of just what exactly is the nature and scope of the right recognized in Article IV(1) of the NPT, and what are its juridical implications (e.g. in tension with the UN Security Council’s order in Resolution 1696 for Iran to cease uranium enrichment), is a subject that I have been thinking/researching about recently, and which was to be the subject of the “think piece” that I was invited to submit to the Melbourne Journal of International Law. Readers will know how that turned out.  I also broached it toward the end of my article last year in the Georgetown Journal of International Law (see the article here).  In any event, I am now working with Marco Roscini and others to publish a set of papers on the subject of the rights of states in international law, that will include an in-depth analysis of these questions. I’m also planning, in the next few days, to publish a piece on this subject elsewhere online, which I will copy here.

These questions actually raise some very deep issues of international law, and analyzing them properly requires serious work, some of which I did in my aborted Melbourne Journal piece. I will plan to publish this work in the papers Marco and I are working on, and in a more applied way in my new book on Iran’s Nuclear Program and International Law.

But let me say this here. Article IV(1) of the NPT states that “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.”  In my view, the recognition by over 190 states parties to the NPT that all states have such an inalienable right, which I interpret to include all elements of the full nuclear fuel cycle including uranium enrichment, strongly suggests that the right to peaceful nuclear energy research, production and use is one of the fundamental rights of states in international law. In my view, both fundamental and acquired rights of states should be understood to create in third parties, both states and international organizations, a legal obligation to respect those rights. This means that other states and international organizations are under an international legal obligation not to act in serious prejudice of states’ rights. In the case of fundamental rights, this reciprocal obligation is of a jus cogens order, meaning that all states and international organizations are under a jus cogens order legal obligation not to act to seriously prejudice the fundamental rights of other states. When states or international organization do act in serious prejudice of a state’s fundamental rights, that action is an internationally wrongful act, and implicates the international responsibility of the acting state or international organization.

According to this analysis, UN Security Council Resolution 1696, which commands Iran to cease uranium enrichment, constitutes a violation of international law, at least as to this particular command, and is void of legal effect (See Article 25 of the UN Charter).

Note that the often heard rebuttal to this argument, which references Article 103 of the UN Charter, is in fact erroneous and inapplicable. Article 103 of the UN Charter provides that “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”  My analysis, which is based on the recognition of a fundamental right of states in international law, and the juridical implication of an obligation in other states and international organizations to respect that right,  is unaffected and unanswered by this provision, which merely recognizes that in the case of a conflict between UN member states’ international legal obligations under the Charter, and their obligations deriving from other sources, the Charter obligations trump.  It does not speak to the legal obligations of the Security Council as an organ of an international organization. Nor does it speak at all to conflicts between the obligations of the UN Charter, and the rights of states in international law. So again, Article 103 of the UN Charter is inapposite and inapplicable to this question.