Hart publishing is announcing the creation of a new, peer-reviewed law journal, the Journal on the Use of Force and International Law. The journal’s EIC’s are James Green, Christian Hendersen, and Tom Ruys. I’ve known James for a long time, and consider him to be one of the leading scholars on the jus ad bellum. He and Christian and Tom have gotten alot of the best scholars writing in this area together to support this new peer-reviewed journal, which I think is a great addition to the quality publication outlets in international security law. Here’s the link to the journal’s homepage, where you can see the advisory board and editorial board (including myself), as well as the call for submissions. I encourage those of us who write in the jus ad bellum area to consider submitting papers to this new journal.
A colleague sent me this today. It’s Iran’s formal response to the IAEA DG’s May 22 report on Iran’s safeguards implementation. I highly recommend that you read it. Its a very thorough response, covering all of the issues raised in the IAEA report, and making detailed and substantive factual and legal arguments. The point of most of my writing about Iran’s nuclear program is just to say that their legal arguments about the IAEA and the NPT should be taken seriously, because many of them are correct. This is a good source to see those legal arguments as made by Iranian officials themselves. I’ll excerpt only the “General Observations” section here, but you really have to read the whole thing – including particularly page 16, where the document says the IAEA is being “more Catholic than the Pope.” LOVE that. Note also the specific calling out of David Albright and ISIS, and the “unprofessional” disclosure of confidential materials to him by IAEA officials.
A. General Observations
1- The report is not balanced and factual since it has not duly reflected the cooperation, letters and explanations of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the questions of/or communication made with the Agency. For more elaboration of this assessment, three letters addressed to the DG are attached.
2- Paragraph 27 of the Safeguards Resolution adopted by the General Conference GC(53)/RES/14 as well as GC(54)/RES/11, mandate the Agency to prepare technically objective and factually correct reports with appropriate references to relevant provisions of the Safeguards Agreement. Regrettably, this statutory requirement has continuously been ignored and has not been observed in this and in the previous reports. The Agency should not arbitrarily step beyond its statutory and legal mandate in preparing its reports, assessments and comments without considering the relevant concrete obligations of a State.
3- More importantly, the IAEA is an independent inter-governmental organization, not a United Nations programme or fund. Therefore, the Agency’s mandate is to carry out its activities in accordance with its rights and obligations under the Statute and the Safeguards Agreements. The Agency should therefore refrain from taking instructions from anonymous States and sources with vested interests or allow unauthorized parties to interfere with its mandates. There are no provisions in the Safeguards Agreements and IAEA Statute which may authorize the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to take over the role of the IAEA in implementing the Safeguards Agreements, impose new requirements, or modify the obligations of the parties to the Safeguards Agreements; nor does the Agency have the right or authority to impose ultra vires demands on Iran by relying upon the UNSC resolutions.
4- The Islamic Republic of Iran has already made it clear, based on the legal provisions such as those of the Agency’s Statute and the Safeguards Agreement as to why the UNSC resolutions against Iran are illegal and unjustified, which have been already explained in INFCIRCs/: 786, 804, 805, 810,
817, 823, 827, 833, 837, 847, 849 and 850. Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities have unlawfully been put
on the agenda of the UNSC and the Council has taken a wrong approach by adopting its politically motivated, illegal and unacceptable resolutions against Iran. Therefore, any request by the Agency stemming from those resolutions is not legitimate and not acceptable.
5- Although the report once again reconfirmed that “the Agency continues to verify the non- diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement”, it keeps using “unusual” and “irrelevant” language with regard to the Safeguards conclusions, by stating: “the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran”, since the Agency has to simply confirm that all declared nuclear material is accounted for and therefore “declared nuclear material in Iran remained in peaceful activities”.
6- The Non-Aligned Movement in its several statements to the Board of Governors has stated that “NAM emphasizes the fundamental distinction between the legal obligations of states in accordance with their respective Safeguards Agreements, as opposed to any confidence building measures undertaken voluntarily that do not constitute a legal safeguards obligation.” and also “NAM takes note that the latest report of the Director General includes many references to events that transpired prior to the previous report contained in document GOV/2009/74 dated 16 November 2009, and contrary to the expectation of NAM, does not mention the responses provided by Iran to the Agency on several issues.”, NAM has also stated that “taking into account the recent developments mentioned above as well as previous Director General’s reports on the implementation of the Work Plan on “Understanding of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency on the Modalities for resolution of the Outstanding Issues” (INFCIRC/711), NAM still looks forward to the safeguards implementation in Iran being conducted in a routine manner”. However, the Director General in preparing his report has unfortunately not heeded these important statements which reflect the concerns of a large number of the United Nations and the Agency Member States.
7- The Agency should strictly observe its obligations under Article VII.F of the Agency’s Statute and Article 5 of the Safeguards Agreement between the I.R. oflran and the Agency, both emphasizing on the confidentiality requirements. As was emphasized in previous Iran’s Explanatory Notes, the information collected during inspections of nuclear facilities should be considered as confidential information. However, once again, the report in contradiction to the Agency’s statutory mandate and the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/214) contains a lot of confidential technical details that should have not been published. The DG by including detailed information in his reports such as the number of installed and/or operating centrifuges, amount of nuclear material fed and/or produced, etc., has demonstrated his inability to fulfill his commitments on confidentiality measures. It comes as no surprise that almost at the same time the DG report is released, some websites such as ISIS, publish the report contained with sort of fictitious calculations as its evaluation on the detailed information of the report. This fact leaves no doubt that ISIS has real time access to the safeguards confidential information, thanks to the DG’s generosity in disclosing confidential information to unauthorized circles before even the less privileged Member States have a chance to examine such reports. We strongly object to this unprofessional and wrong pattern of non-compliance with the legal framework of the IAEA. This continuous violation must be stopped.
8- Regrettably, the main portion of the DG’s report is based on certain information related to missile issue, not involving nuclear material activities. The Agency is not entitled to step beyond its mandate to the bilateral Safeguards Agreement, or interfere with Iran’s national security concerns on the pretext of Iran’s nuclear program. Moreover, the DG has relied on some forged, fabricated and false information provided by western intelligence services and known sources hostile to Iran, assessed as “overall credible” information, without any authenticity verification, while independent observers have revealed part of the false information used by the Agency and criticized ironically its immature assessment on allegations against Iran.
9- The report in its introductory part enters into a legal qualification and judgment that is not absolutely at the discretion and the responsibility of the Director General of the IAEA. Defining unilaterally obligations on a sovereign State is beyond the mandate of the Director General. As clearly described above, the DG has deviated from his mandate. Iran reserves its right to file claims against his acts on the damages arising.
10- In the light of the above, the claims and baseless allegations against the Islamic Republic of Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities as contained in the DG’s report (GOV/2013/27, dated 22 May 2013) are unprofessional, unfair, illegal and politicized.
A colleague asked if I would write something on the relationship if any between a finding by the IAEA of a state’s noncompliance with its comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) on one hand, and a breach of Article III of the NPT by that state on the other. In brief, does noncompliance with a CSA per se constitute a breach of NPT Article III? Well, as it happens I did cover this topic at some length in my 2011 book. So I will just excerpt here from that book, Interpreting the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, pgs. 87-94 (footnotes removed):
I would like to pay particular analytical attention at this point to the treaty interpretations given by NWS during the target period in order to justify the conditioning of nuclear supply, and recognition of the Article IV(1) right to peaceful use, upon NNWS compliance with an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are several points of treaty interpretation included within the logical progression of interpretation maintained by NWS officials. I identified these steps of interpretive progression as occurring within the following transitive sequence:
- Noncompliance with an IAEA safeguards agreement constitutes a breach of NPT Article III,
- A breach of NPT Article III results in the invalidity of the rights and obligations in Article IV,
- Thus, noncompliance with an IAEA safeguards agreement results in the invalidity of the rights and obligations in Article IV.
As I explained in Chapter 3, this conditional normative linkage between NPT Articles III and IV, and the transitive conclusion that noncompliance with a safeguards agreement constitutes breach of the NPT, was used by NWS officials during the target era in order to justify the non-recognition of Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technologies under NPT Article IV(1), as well as to justify a cessation of nuclear assistance to Iran by supplier states, pursuant to the obligation in Article IV(2).
The interpretation of a conditional linkage between Article III and Article IV, which forms an integral part of this transitive sequence, is an argument that I have already addressed above. I concluded above that NNWS compliance or non-compliance with Articles I, II & III has no per se conditional effect upon the residual right of NNWS to engage in the peaceful use of nuclear energy materials and technologies recognized in Article IV(1). This conclusion, taking away one of the two interpretive pillars of this transitive sequence, on its own renders the interpretive sequence incorrect.
However, I will assume arguendo for the moment that the NWS interpretation on conditionality between Article III and Article IV is correct. I will do so to show that, even if it was correct, the other interpretive pillar of this transitive sequence – that noncompliance with an IAEA safeguards agreement constitutes a breach of NPT Article III – is also incorrect.
This is a really interesting op-ed in the NYT by Francois Nicoullaud, who was France’s ambassador to Iran from 2001-2005. Nicoullaud claims that Rouhani was the prime mover in Iran’s termination of its nuclear weapons research program in 2003. You can read about the data points on which he bases this claim. I’m not sure what else to say about this – there are a number of possible implications. One being the implication that Iran had a nuclear weapons research program prior to 2003. This is of course something that Western intelligence agencies have asserted, but that has never been confirmed. Another implication being that if this claim is true, and Rouhani really was behind the cessation of this research program, it would be a feather in his cap in terms of his credibility to negotiate on the nuclear issue now, and hopefully to be able to bring Khamenei along to an agreement if necessary.
I know this piece came out a couple of weeks ago, and I saw it flying around listserves and Twitter at the time, but I just now got around to reading it myself. I think it deserves all the buzz it got. Its a really great piece and reads very insightfully and fairly about the current state of affairs between the West and Iran, and the opportunities presented by this moment. I think its analysis is very useful, and I agree 100% with the authors’ prescriptions.
One of the best sections of the piece is the authors’ discussion of the coercive policies of the United States against Iran, including sanctions:
Washington could continue with the same approach it has followed since the fall of the Shah, namely, a “two-track” policy based primarily on sanctions and isolation that does not exclude diplomacy. While American-led international sanctions have damaged the Iranian economy and demonstrated the world’s opposition to Iran’s nuclear program, they have done little to change Iran’s actions or policies.
One alternative would be to increase pressure. And indeed, many in Washington believe that more sanctions and threats of military action are the right response. Under a policy of “coercive diplomacy,” the US would give Iran a clear ultimatum: agree to US demands on nuclear issues by a certain date, or the US will take military action.9 The former diplomat Dennis Ross wrote recently that the Obama administration should make Iran’s leaders an offer they must take or leave within a set period of time, and he implies that the option of military force should be available if they reject the offer. He contends that “coercive diplomacy succeeds when threats are believed and the game playing and manipulation stop.”10
Some advocates of coercive diplomacy argue that such an approach helped President Kennedy pressure Khrushchev to withdraw Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba. But a final agreement was reached when Kennedy gave Khrushchev a face-saving exit and offered to withdraw America’s Jupiter missiles from Turkey. A few years earlier, when China shelled the islands of Matsu and Quemoy in an attempt to intimidate and threaten Taiwan, President Eisenhower demonstrated his own desire to avoid ultimatums. Rather than define the point at which the US would take military action, he said that he would “just confuse” the press when asked what he intended to do.
Ike took to heart Clausewitz’s insight that a nation fighting for survival will persevere regardless of pressure. More coercion will only reinforce the belief among Iran’s leaders that America’s goal remains destruction of the regime, hardening their resistance and making diplomatic progress less attainable. On military action, it is worth remembering what President Johnson’s national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, said in the 1990s about the Vietnam War. What surprised him most, he acknowledged, was “the endurance of the enemy.”11 Bundy admitted that he had placed too much faith in “the power of coercion.”
“Coercive diplomacy” is an oxymoron. Invariably the coercive side dominates the diplomatic side. Intransigent enemies who threaten US interests and security cannot be ignored; yet the United States’ experience in solving such problems by the use of coercive action such as war or sanctions that end in war has been highly costly in human lives, resources, and its global position during the past sixty years. As in Vietnam, coercion has often failed to achieve US objectives or a negotiated settlement that gave us most of what we needed. Yet the US has been impressively successful in achieving its objectives when it has placed diplomacy above punitive measures.
Pressure has helped get Iran to negotiate; but diplomatic negotiation cannot succeed unless each side gets some of what it needs and unless each side comes to believe that the other wants an agreement and is willing to comply with it. At present the US has imposed not only an arms ban but a nearly complete economic embargo on Iran, although Iran can still gain access to the US financial system through foreign banks and other institutions. We are not proposing a preemptive suspension of sanctions without firm agreements from Iran on nuclear-related issues. But we do believe that the piling on of more coercive sanctions and ultimatums, particularly when there are new hopes for the diplomatic process to get underway, will undermine or even preclude the possibility of negotiating a nuclear deal.
That’s some gold right there. And I hope the “sanction first, ask questions later” crowd in DC is listening.
The ABA Journal is seeking nominations for its annual list of the 100 best legal blogs. None of the ACL bloggers can nominate ACL because the rules say you can’t nominate your own blog. In fact, they say that anyone who has posted on a blog is discouraged from nominating that blog – which I interpret to mean doing actual posts on the blog, not commenting on posts. Commenters are still fully eligible.
So, if you don’t fall into these discouraged categories, and you would like to nominate ACL for inclusion in the list of 100 best legal blogs, we would really appreciate it if you would use the form at this site to nominate us.
Nominations have to be submitted no later than 7:00 pm (ET) on Friday, August 9, 2013.
Thanks in advance.
I really think this quote from Gary Samore, a former key NSC official, sums up one of the central problems in the dispute between the West and Iran over Iran’s nuclear program.
The establishment of a bilateral channel is a necessary but not sufficient condition for coming to an agreement,” Mr. Samore said. “They want a nuclear weapons capability, and we want to deny them a nuclear weapons capability. Finding a compromise between those two objectives is going to be very difficult.
You see he’s actually being candid here about the line in the sand that the US has drawn in the negotiations. They want to deny Iran the capability to build a nuclear weapon. And therein lies the problem. That standard has no basis in international law whatsoever. That means this line in the sand drawn by the US is completely arbitrary and subjective. It has no authority or precedent as an international norm. And as I’ve said many times it is profoundly discriminatory. There are many states around the world that have the capability to build a nuclear weapon. They just choose not to. Iran is in no different technological situation than they are. In fact, they are at the moment quite technologically behind many of them in terms of this capability. So why single out Iran for this arbitrary standard? That is the problem that makes the Western approach to negotiations with Iran so bereft of legitimacy and so unsupportable. They’re just making up an arbitrary, subjective, standard that has no basis in international law or norms, and that is blatantly discriminatory. And they are enforcing it on Iran through crippling economic sanctions that are increasingly harming ordinary Iranian civilians. In a nutshell, that explains why I feel so strongly that this is an issue that needs attention and why I spend so much time writing about it.
Now, in the same article in which the Samore quote appears, and in this WSJ article (subscription, unfortunately) as well, it is reported that the US has recently loosened some of its sanctions on Iran with regard to trade in medical and agricultural products. This appears to me to be a very welcome act of goodwill on the part of the US, so I want to give credit where its due. Again, it appears to be an action aimed at signalling to President-elect Rouhani, US willingness to negotiate in good faith about sanctions relief, and to invite good faith efforts on his part as well. If that’s true and if that willingness on the part of the US is genuine, then I think this is a very welcome development, and one of the first signs I’ve seen of real good faith effort on the part of the US administration.