If you follow me on Twitter this won’t be the first you’ve heard, but my new book on Iran is now actually in print. The publisher agreed to put it out in both paperback and hardback from the start, so a copy of the paperback is only about $35, which I’m very pleased about. It means less in royalties for me, but more potential distribution and therefore hopefully more impact. You can see it for order here at OUP’s website. It’s also available on Amazon.
I just yesterday published a piece about the book over at Opinio Juris. In that piece I gave a summary of the legal questions the book asks about the history of the dispute.
I wanted to say here in particular that, with the publisher’s blessing, Chapters 5 and 7 of the book have been made publicly available on my SSRN page here and here. I hope that these chapters will be of particular interest to readers of this blog, who are interested in serious legal analysis of how the IAEA has handled the Iran case. You’ll find that material in Chapter 5. It’s basically a full fleshing out of the posts that I’ve been doing on this blog for the past four years.
Chapter 7 is the chapter on the JCPOA. This is the chapter that I had to wait for about 6 months to write while seeing if the JCPOA would really stick. But it is sticking, at least for the moment, so this chapter will hopefully be useful for understanding the legal implications of the JCPOA.
In this book I’ve basically said all that I have to say about the historical legal issues involved in the Iran case. Disputes over the JCPOA certainly will continue, and there may very likely be future legal disputes concerning the Iran case that I’ll comment on here and elsewhere. But now I can refer people to an actual book and not just to a string of blog posts to explain my legal analysis of these past questions. I’m glad to have that catharsis.
I’m in the U.K. at the moment, by the way. For the past two days I’ve been participating in a really interesting and useful Pugwash workshop on the topic of U.S. nuclear weapons stationed in Europe, and the discrete subject of nuclear sharing agreements among NATO allies. I’ll probably do a separate post about that.
I’ll also be on a panel at a Chatham House event titled “The Iran Nuclear Deal: One Year On” next Monday the 3rd. So if you’re in London, come by and say hello.
Did Russian use of an Iranian base constitute the supply, sale or transfer of combat aircraft to Iran?Posted: August 22, 2016
In a weird development last week, Russia is widely reported to have used the Nojeh military base in Iran as a staging point for airstrikes by Russian military aircraft in Syria. This was, apparently, the first time since World War II that any foreign military had been allowed to, at least temporarily, station military assets at an Iranian military base. The most recent reports are that Russia is no longer making use of any facility in Iran for this purpose.
What interested me about this story was the criticism forthcoming from U.S. State Department spokesman Mark Toner, who said in a press conference that Russia’s use of this Iranian military facility may constitute a violation of U.N. Security Council 2231’s prohibition on the “supply, sale and transfer of combat aircraft to Iran unless approved in advance by the U.N. Security Council.” He appears here to have been referring to Annex B, paragraph 5 of UNSCR 2231.
I may be one of the few people on earth whose mind would work this way, but when I heard this criticism, I immediately thought of the issue of the stationing by the U.S. of nuclear weapons at military facilities of Non-nuclear Weapon States in Europe – an issue that received some attention lately when, during the recent coup attempt in Turkey, the power was cut off to Incirlik air force base where some 80 of these U.S. nuclear weapons are housed.
Now, anyone who has read Article I of the NPT knows that this provision prohibits the “transfer to any recipient whatsoever [of] nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” by a Nuclear Weapon State, such as the U.S. In my 2009 book (pgs 13-15), I argued that the U.S. policy of stationing nuclear weapons on the territory of Non-nuclear Weapon States in Europe does violence to both Articles I & II of the NPT.
Doesn’t it seem like the State Department, in its criticism of Russia’s stationing of its combat aircraft at an Iranian military base as an unlawful “transfer” of combat aircraft to Iran, is essentially endorsing my reading of NPT Article I and my argument that U.S. stationing of nuclear weapons on NNWS military bases is an unlawful “transfer” of those weapons pursuant to NPT Article I?
That’s how I’ll choose to see it.
I wanted to draw readers’ attention to a short piece by Tyler Cullis with the above title. You can find it here. In my view this is a good piece of work explaining U.S. sanctions commitments under the JCPOA in detail, and I recommend it to readers. It is a good supplement to, and goes into greater detail than, my recent piece here about U.S. sanctions compliance. I think it persuasively shows that U.S. commitments under the JCPOA go considerably beyond the initial lifting of sanctions, and it provides examples of compliance-contested issues that have arisen since Implementation Day.
See it here. Only $34.95 in paperback. No need to look anywhere else for your holiday shopping!
I’m very pleased to host a guest post by Theodore Richard, an attorney with the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). The piece is on the fascinating topic of “nuclear demonstration shots” during armed conflict. I confess that I had never heard of this concept. In the piece, the author argues that such demonstration shots are, in theory, not in violation of international law. I’ll jump in in the comments section with some thoughts and questions, and of course I encourage others to do the same, in a collegial and engaging manner.
The author wishes to make it clear that the views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the DoD or the U.S. Government.
Legality of Nuclear Demonstration Shots in Wartime
By Theodore Richard
Dr. Justin Anderson posted an article and follow up about the application of the laws of war to the potential use of nuclear weapons. One point he made was that not every potential use of nuclear weapons would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences. He provided examples, specifically identifying a high altitude demonstration shot as having limited humanitarian consequences.
This example, however, generates a question about the legality of potential nuclear demonstration shots. Could it be possible to interpret the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) as prohibiting wartime use of nuclear weapons, including demonstration shots? Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union held such a view during the Cold War. In the early 1980s, the Washington Post reported that in the event of a Soviet invasion, NATO contemplated whether its “first use” of a nuclear weapon in response should be a demonstration shot detonated over empty water to show resolve.
At a glance, the first paragraph of the LTBT might appear to support the prohibition of this or any demonstration shot. It says, “Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control: … in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas… .”
The treaty, however, does not support that interpretation when looking at the entire document, including its historical background. The complete reading, rather than an assessment of isolated text, is necessary to understand the treaty’s meaning. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties holds that a treaty is to be interpreted in accordance with the plain meaning of terms, in their context, and in light of the treaty’s object and purpose. The United States and Soviet position in 1963 was that the treaty prohibited testing, not wartime use. The treaty’s scope is limited in the title, which establishes that the treaty’s object and purpose is limited to testing. The treaty’s text then further defines the prohibition as to testing within the atmosphere, outer space, or the oceans.
President Kennedy made this point clear in 1963, when he explained the LTBT to the nation. He clarified that the LTBT only restricted nuclear testing. The treaty would not “mean an end to the threat of nuclear war. It will not reduce nuclear stockpiles; it will not halt the production of nuclear weapons; it will not restrict their use in time of war.”
Although Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the White House Special Counsel Ted Sorensen thought that applying the LTBT to wartime use was “far-fetched,” others were concerned that the LTBT might be read in a way to prohibit wartime use. Ultimately, the United States asked for the Soviet position on the question. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko was presented with the “possibility that Article One might be read to outlaw use of nuclear weapons in war. Gromyko looked baffled. He said ‘this treaty deals with the prohibition of nuclear tests in three environments. Of course it is not a prohibition of nuclear weapons or weapons in general, although the USSR is in favor of general and complete disarmament. The scope of the treaty is self-explanatory.’”
Similarly, Secretary Rusk told the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1963, “Article I of the treaty in no way inhibited our ability to use nuclear weapons in either general or limited hostilities and pointed out that this had been made categorically clear in the President’s speech, the Secretary’s speech at the time of signing the treaty, the President’s message transmitting the treaty to the Senate, and the Secretary’s testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee. It was not a ‘ban the bomb’ treaty. Mr Harriman stated that, when he had raised the subject with Gromyko, the latter had appeared to be baffled as to our reason for raising the question.”
Could other treaties limit nuclear demonstration shots during wartime? They were not prohibited by the 1899 or 1907 Hague Conventions, nor by the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The other potential source would be the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, but it was negotiated with the understanding that it applied only to conventional weapons. Even if it did apply, it would not necessarily prohibit a demonstration or warning shot where neither the adversary nor a civilian population was actually affected because such a shot would not rise to the level of an attack under Article 49.
If the concern relates to an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) generated from the blast adversely impacting civilians, then Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I would require the EMP effects to be directed against a legitimate military objective; Article 57 would require an attacker to take feasible precautions to avoid civilian loss of life and property damage; and Article 51(5)(b) would require the effects be proportional (meaning that the expected loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects cannot be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the EMP).
While the United States has rejected Additional Protocol I for ratification and rejects the applicability of its new rules, it applies fundamental principles of the law of war to nuclear weapon use. Thus, the United States would still evaluate demonstration shots for compliance with longstanding, fundamental rules of warfare. Wartime demonstration shots would not be prohibited by any currently existing treaty unless they otherwise violate the law of war.
One often reads complaints by Iranian officials, and by the Iranian public, that the U.S. is not complying with the commitments it undertook in the JCPOA to ease economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for Iran’s compliance with its JCPOA commitments to limit its nuclear program. This got me wondering whether this is in fact the case.
As far as I can tell, the U.S. has in fact complied with all of its specifically delineated sanctions-lifting commitments that are due for compliance at the present stage of the JCPOA’s schedule. This explanatory document released by the U.S. Treasury provides a detailed review of the specific sanctions-lifting actions the U.S. has taken, and their relationship to the JCPOA. I haven’t seen any commentator seriously call into question this recitation of what the U.S. government has done, nor have I seen any persuasive allegations that the U.S. has not complied with the letter of its commitments under the JCPOA to this point.
Rather, what seems to be at the root of the complaints by Iranian officials and the Iranian public is disappointment caused by an earlier excess of expectations about the economic benefits that would flow from the JCPOA’s commitments of sanctions relief, and about how quickly those benefits would be realized.
As others have explained, the reasons why the economic benefits of the JCPOA’s sanctions relief commitments have to this point been disappointingly slim are manifold and complex. First, the JCPOA sanctions commitments only required the U.S. to remove sanctions that were specifically related to Iran’s nuclear program, leaving in place a complex legal architecture of primary and secondary economic and financial sanctions targeting Iran based on U.S. concerns about human rights in Iran, and Iran’s connection to terrorist groups. These remaining sanctions have, by many accounts, significantly deterred foreign investment and commerce with Iran, due to fears particularly by non-U.S. banks that they will inadvertently run afoul of this byzantine web of continuing sanctions, and face stiff financial penalties. Second, Iran’s economy is notoriously opaque and riddled with corruption. This creates an environment of business risk that is simply unattractive to many foreign companies.
These and other factors have combined to produce only modest economic benefits for Iran over the past six months since the lifting of sanctions, which has in turn made the initial excitement and optimism about the JCPOA in Iran fade significantly.
Tyler Cullis has written extensively on the issue of U.S. sanctions on Iran post-JCPOA, including detailed analysis of the most recent developments, and possibilities for narrowing the gap between commitments and expectations. I recommend his work to readers.
So what are we to make of the gap between Iranian expectation and commitment reality with regard to sanctions relief in the JCPOA? Were Iranian negotiators bamboozled by their U.S. counterparts into thinking that the sanctions relief commitments the U.S. was undertaking would lead to an economic windfall for Iran? I doubt it. I’m confident that the Iranian negotiators were sophisticated enough to know exactly what they had bargained for, and understood the limited nature of the economic benefits that would flow to Iran, particularly during the early months following the lifting of sanctions. I suspect that, just like the negotiators from the P5+1, the Iranian negotiators knew they were not going to get everything they wanted out of the JCPOA. That’s the nature of compromise.
But I also suspect that the Iranian negotiators understood that with the lifting of U.N. Security Council sanctions and European Union sanctions, also provided for under the JCPOA, doors would be opened that were not previously open to foreign investment and commerce with Iran, and that even under the pall of continuing U.S. sanctions, eventually businesses in Europe and Asia would become confident enough to take their first furtive steps back into the potentially hugely lucrative Iranian economy. And that as ever when there is sufficient economic incentive, creative minds would devise financial means to facilitate these transactions.
For those of us who want the JCPOA to be successful and to remain adhered to by all of its parties, the hope now must be that the understandable disappointment felt by Iranians can be tempered by a more realistic, cautiously optimistic patience, and that it does not translate into political loss for President Rouhani and his moderate allies in the 2017 Iranian Presidential election.
And please God don’t let Donald Trump be elected President here.
The online academic journal Questions of International Law has just published a symposium on my book Cyber Operations and the Use of Force in International Law (which is now available also in paperback). Two excellent scholars, Prof. Christian Henderson (Sussex University) and Dr. Emanuele Sommario (Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna – Pisa) discuss my analysis of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello issues arising from the use of cyber technologies. Their reviews are themselves very interesting contributions to the debate on cyber security and well worth reading.
Another excellent (and very positive!) review of my book has been written by Vincent Roobaert and has been published in the latest issue of the NATO Legal Gazette.