Aluminum Tubes Again . . . Really?

As if the other similarities between the Western ramp up to its unjustified and disasterous war with Iraq on the one hand, and the West’s current program of action vis a vis Iran (this time facilitated and not checked by the IAEA) on the other, weren’t earily similar enough, we now have yet another similarity.  Reuters reports with alarm the transfer of aluminum – one of the most ubiquitously used materials in the world – from a swiss company to an Iranian company. This transfer, Reuters breathlessly reports, could of course have no other end use than in Iran’s centrifuge-based uranium enrichment program.  Not that there is any evidence that it ended up there. It just may have (did David Albright co-author this piece? I may have missed it in the byline).

You do remember the furore over Iraq’s reported aquisition of aluminum tubes in the runup to the 2003 war, right? Well if you don’t, see Dave Chappelle’s explanation here at about 1:21 (viewer discretion advised – I think Chappelle is hilarious, but his comedy isnt for everyone).

This story is particularly groan-inducing because it comes almost ten years TO THE DAY after IAEA DG Mohamed ElBaradei gave a speech to the UN reporting, among other findings, the IAEA’s determination that the aluminum tubes acquired by Iraq had not in fact been used in a nuclear program. 

An old phrase about those who do not learn from history comes to mind . . .

The Knives are Out – Olli Heinonen’s Criticisms of Former IAEA Colleagues in the WSJ

I just saw this article in the WSJ, including excerpts from a lengthy interview with Olli Henonen. I find it shocking how he goes after his former IAEA colleagues, criticizing them for their “missteps” on both Iran and Syria.  He even says that they developed the equivalent of “Stockholm Syndrome” with regard to these nations, and that this somehow explains why they were so kid-gloved in their treatment of Iran and Syria. Wow. That’s a pretty bold and offensive allegation to make about both DG ElBaradei and DG Blix.

What comes across to me in this article is a picture of Heinonen as the one with biases of mysterious origin. He comes across as hawkish, with the kind of inexplicable, discriminatory focus of attention on Arab/Persian countries in the ME (to be fair, he’s also worried about Pakistan), and a set of unfounded but deeply held suspicions, and similarly unfounded speculations of an exclusively negative quality, that one usually hears from US government officials and the DC nonproliferation community.  Not the ideological company I would have expected the veteran Finnish diplomat to keep. But one’s true colors are one’s true colors. And I think that Heinonen is clearly showing them here, and that he wants to tell the world loud and clear what he thinks about his former bosses at the IAEA – like Nobel Peace Prize winner DG Elbaradei – whose fault it is that Iran has reached a point of industrial and scientific capacity that Japan, Germany, South Africa, Brazil, India, Israel, and South Korea also have, to name a few. But of course, we don’t need to worry about any of them.

Kazakhstan Meeting between the P5+1 and Iran

Like many, I have been quite pleasantly surprised and heartened by the relatively positive reports coming out of the meeting between Iran and the P5+1 in Almaty, Kazakhstan this week.  It does appear that there has been some sense and prudence displayed among the P5+1 in actually making some meaningful concessions in the kinds of sanctions relief they are now putting on the table. This could well be the first step toward a diplomatic resolution of the current crisis, if – and this is a big if – both sides can continue displaying good sense, pragmatism and positivity. We know from sad experience in this and other diplomatic contexts that auspicious beginnings often produce disappointing results. On this subject, see this insightful analysis by Paul Pillar.

EU Sanctions on Iranian Businesses Adjudged Illegal

I’ve also been meaning to write something for some time on the recent cases in which the EU General Court has ruled that sanctions imposed on Iranian businesses unilaterally by the EU – i.e. unauthorized by the U.N. Security Council – are unlawful. These are very significant cases, and as I understand it the illegality of these sanctions has become so well settled that the affected parties are now moving on to actions against the EU seeking compensation for the harm caused by these illegal acts of the EU.  As noted in this report of the most recent case, the Court has ruled that “The Council (of EU governments) is in breach of the obligation to state reasons and the obligation to disclose to the applicant … the evidence adduced against it.”  The Bank Saderat case can be viewed at this link.

EU law is one of the many areas outside of my expertise, so I would welcome comments from ACL colleagues and others who could explain to readers the bases for these decisions of the General Court better than I can.

Penn State Symposium Video is Up

You can find it here.  You may have to load an updated media player (called “Mediasite”) on your computer.  It does make the presentation look good, though.  The video is also divided into segments, which makes it easier to find particular panels or presentations. I and Ambassador Butler are on Panel 1. I dont think I’m at my most eloquent here, but I think I do manage to get my points across. I really recommend that you listen to Ambassador Butler’s presentation. I also HIGHLY recommend that you watch both FLynt’s and Hillary’s presentations – Flynt gives the opening address, and Hillary gives the concluding address. I was very imporessed by them, and persuaded of their views.

Arab League Boycott of Nonproliferation Meetings

Wow this is a big deal – the Arab League, led by Egypt, are threatening to boycott nonproliferation meetings, including the upcoming NPT PrepCom meeting in April. They are upset about the lack of progress in actually progressing the agenda of a WMD free zone in the Middle East, and in particular over the non-occurrence of a conference on this issue that NPT states parties agreed by consensus in the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference would be held in 2012.

Readers will remember that I wrote a couple of pieces about this months ago when we learned the 2012 conference wouldn’t be happening.  See here and here.

I think some people have underestimated how strongly Arab states feel about this subject and how, as I explained in those previous pieces, they link the concept of a ME WMD Free Zone very directly back to the decision to indefinitely extend the NPT in 1995. To them it was part and parcel of the bargain reached in 1995 that made the positive vote on indefinite extension happen.

I’m personally glad that they are taking a stand on this issue, and I hope that they keep the pressure up and actually follow through with their boycott if necessary. The hypocrisy and inequity of the West’s willfully blind eye toward Israel’s possession and implied threats of use of nuclear weapons are unacceptable to the rest of the states in the ME, as well they should be. I think the Arab states have finally had enough of the failed promises of the West to address this problem, and that they are saying clearly that the future of the NPT regime itself depends on meaningful progress on this issue.

Yousaf Butt on Washington Post/ISIS Magnets Story

I just had to draw readers’ attention to yet another great new piece by Yousaf Butt, this time in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. In a really first class piece of explanatory journalism, Yousaf takes apart and persuasively discredits a Washington Post story based on information and analysis provided by ISIS and David Albright. Yousaf is once again shining the light of actual scientific and objectively analytical rigor, upon the analysis of ISIS and Albright that has become widely seen as superficial, speculative, and agenda driven.

The North Korean Nuclear Test

Readers will remember that I wrote this piece on North Korea before their most recent nuclear explosive test. I’m hearing some talk that they might be prepping for yet another one soon.

Here are a couple of the best pieces I’ve seen written about the new test recently. One is by Graham Allison in the NYT; the other is by Jeffrey Lewis at FP.

I’m not a technical guy, but the fact that NK now seems to have both a plutonium and a uranium track working for producing nuclear weapons; their apparent success in increasing test yield while at the same time making progress in miniaturization; along with the ever increasing range of their missiles – all this is pretty freaking dangerous stuff. 

As I said before, the North Koreans concern me a whole lot more that Iran, India, Pakistan, or Israel. And it’s because of what I perceive to be their just plain nuttiness. Irrationality driven by intense paranoid delusion; the completely autocratic nature of the government and its control over information to the North Korean people; and the government’s over-the-top aggressive rhetoric towards its neighbors and towards the U.S. 

If the North Koreans didn’t have such an obviously developing nuclear weapons program, all of the above wouldn’t bother me so much. On the other hand, if they were developing a nuclear weapons program and weren’t so nutty that wouldn’t bother me so much either. But the combination of the two, and the thought that some day not too far away we may have to deal with a North Korea that really does have the capacity to shoot a nuclear armed ICBM at Japan, and then soon after at the continental U.S. – this seriously concerns me.

As I said in my previous piece, I know well all of the problems associated with any attempt to seriously do something about the North Korean threat. But we have got to come up with something better than just watching this happen.

As this is a blog devoted to arms control law, I suppose I should mention the international law applicable to North Korea right now. In terms of their possession and proliferation of nuclear weapons, the only law currently binding on them is the raft of U.N. Security Council resolutions commanding them to stop their nuclear weapons program and re-join the NPT. Then of course there’s Resolution 1540 on export controls and proliferation generally.

Unfortunately, in this case, one also has to consider the rules of international law on the use of nuclear weapons. This of course was the subject of the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion. Not that I expect the North Korean leadership cares, but that opinion, along with what I consider to be settled customary international law at this point, establishes clearly that any use by North Korea of nuclear weapons against any other country, under any reasonably foreseeable circumstances, would be illegal under international law.

The ICJ of course waffled on the question of whether a state could lawfully use nuclear weapons “in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.” Of course, extreme circumstances of self-defense would only go, if anywhere, to the jus ad bellum question of whether a use of force against another state would be lawful. It does not go to the jus in bello question of whether the use of nuclear weapons during an armed conflict would be lawful under international humanitarian law, and its restrictive principles of distinction and proportionality particularly.  As Yoram Dinstein has written about this part of the ICJ’s holding “[This] sentence is the most troublesome. The linkage between the use of nuclear weapons and ‘extreme circumstances’ . . . is hard to digest: it appears to be utterly inconsistent with the basic tenet that [the law of armed conflict] applies equally to all belligerent States, irrespective of the merits of their cause . . .” (The Conduct of Hostilities, pg. 78)

Thus, any international use of nuclear weapons by North Korea, even if it was under full-out attack by the U.S. and South Korea and Japan, would be extremely difficult to justify under international humanitarian law. I’m sure that the imaginative out there might be able to come up with some hypothetical scenarios under which legality might be arguable – perhaps a tactical or low yield use targeting an isolated military object in South Korea, or in the Sea of Japan or East China Sea against a naval target. But fully complying with the distinction and proportionality principles relative to targeting in the modern law of armed conflict, as well as with international environmental law rules operative in armed conflict, would be extremely difficult – approaching impossibility.

Make Tehran a Serious Offer

Excellent new piece from Yousaf Butt today in the National Interest. Kind of sums up everything going on with sanctions and diplomacy regarding Iran. Yousaf is pretty incredible in keeping up with all of the good writing about Iran and producing pieces like this that give, in my opinion, the right analysis and policy recommendations. I dont think he sleeps!