Tariq Rauf on How Managed Access under the Additional Protocol Would Work in IranPosted: July 8, 2015 Filed under: Nuclear 3 Comments
I just wanted to quickly draw readers’ attention to a new piece published today by Tariq Rauf over at Atomic Reporters. Tariq is well known in the nonproliferation expert community. He’s currently Director of SIPRI’s Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme, and was previously Head of the Verification and Security Policy Coordination Office at the IAEA.
In this new piece Tariq very usefully explains in practical detail what managed access to sites in Iran by IAEA inspectors would likely look like under the terms of the Additional Protocol, which Iran will almost certainly ratify and bring into force under a final deal with the P5+1.
Tariq provides an explication of some of the limits that can be imposed by Iran on inspectors’ access to sites . These are some of the limits that I was referring to in my piece a couple of weeks ago looking forward to safeguards under such a final deal. Tariq, however, gives far more useful detail than I did.
Has anyone seen this? Not sure who the author may be. http://www.scribd.com/doc/39038338/Pierre-Goldschmidt-Critique#scribd
Dang. No I hadn’t seen that. No idea who would have written it.
These are of course only suggestions by Tariq Rauf, not what has been agreed at this stage. It should be noted that IAEA inspections were always supposed to be kept to the absolute minimum, so as to “avoid undue interference in peaceful nuclear activities” — remembering the promoting civilian nuclear programs is also a purpose of the NPT bargain